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I.

INTRODUCTION

In PlannedParenthoodof Southeastern Pennsylvaniav. Casey, a plurality of
the United States Supreme Court upheld a state statute that required "the giving
of truthful, nonmisleading information about the nature of [an abortion]
procedure, the attendant health risks and those of childbirth, and the 'probable
gestational age' of the fetus."' In the wake of Casey, several states began to
23
require physicians to offer to perform, or even to perform,3 an ultrasound prior

Jennings Professor, Elon University School of Law; M.A. and Ph.D, University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill; J.D., Notre Dame Law School.
1.
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1991) (plurality opinion)
(citing Akron v. Akron Cent. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 444 (1983); Thronburgh v. Am.
Coll. Of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 772 (1986)).
2.
Five states require physicians to offer to perform an ultrasound. Requirements for
Ultrasound, Posting
to
State
www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs

Policies

in

Brief

GUTTMACHER

INSTITUTE

2,

/spibRFU.pdf (last updated Apr. 1, 2015).
3.
Thirteen states, including North Carolina, require a woman to have an ultrasound prior to
having an abortion. Id.; see, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.85 (2013), invalidated by Stuart v.
Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 250 (4th Cir. 2014). Presumably because ultrasounds are routinely
conducted prior to an abortion to determine the gestational age and location of the fetus, these
mandatory ultrasound laws have not been challenged on Fourteenth Amendment due process
grounds.
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to an abortion to provide additional "truthful, nonmisleading" information "to
ensure that a woman apprehend the full consequences of her decision."4 Three
states North Carolina, Oklahoma, and Texas-went even further and adopted
legislation-frequently called speech-and-display laws-requiring that (i) a
woman who seeks an abortion undergo an ultrasound, (ii) the sonogram images
be displayed so that she can see them, and more controversially, (iii) the
physician who is to perform the abortion provide a medical description of the
images that includes the "presence, location, and dimensions of the unborn child
within the uterus" and "the presence of external members and internal organs, if
present and viewable."
Although the physician is required to display and
describe the image, the woman may "avert[ ] her eyes from the displayed
images" and "refus[e] to hear the simultaneous explanation and medical
description." 6 North Carolina's statute, like the speech-and-display provisions in
Texas and Oklahoma, provides an exception in cases of medical emergency.
Not surprisingly, these speech-and-display laws were challenged before they
ever took effect. What was surprising was that the physicians and abortion
providers who sought an injunction did not base their claims solely on a
woman's Fourteenth Amendment due process right. 9 Rather, the plaintiffs also
asked the federal courts to strike down the speech-and-display laws on First
Amendment grounds.' 0 In particular, the challengers argued that the speech-anddisplay provisions constituted government-compelled speech" and, therefore,
violated the physicians' "right to refrain from speaking at all."1 2 The district
courts agreed and enjoined the statutes without ever reaching the due process
claim.1 3 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit upheld the Texas statute, relying in large

4.
Casey, 505 U.S. at 882.
5.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.85(a)(2)-(4) (2013); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1738.3d(B)(2)-(4) (West Supp. 2012); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.012(a)(4)(B)-(C)
(West Supp. 112012).
6.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.85(b).
7.
Id. § 90-21.85(a); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-738.3d(D); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE ANN. § 171.0124.
8.
The Texas and North Carolina statutes were both challenged in federal court. See Stuart,
774 F.3d at 243; Texas Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 573
(5th Cir. 2012). The plaintiffs challenging the Oklahoma statute raised only state constitutional
challenges in Oklahoma state court. See Petition at 5, 10-12, Nova Health Sys. v. Edmondson, No.
CV-2010-533 (D. Okla. Apr. 27, 2010), 2010 WL 1734526.
9.
See id. at 10-12.
10. See id. at 11-12.
11. See Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 806 F. Supp. 2d 942, 969
(W.D. Tex. 2011), vacated in part, 667 F.3d 570 (5th Cir. 2012); Stuart v. Huff, 834 F. Supp. 2d
424, 427, 428 (M.D.N.C. 2011) (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.85).
12. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977).
13. See Lakey, 806 F. Supp. 2d at 977 (granting a preliminary injunction against the Texas
law); Stuart, 834 F. Supp. 2d at 436 (granting a preliminary injunction against the North Carolina
law). The Oklahoma statute has been enjoined as well, but on state constitutional grounds. See
Order Granting Summary Judgment Declaring Ultrasound Act as an Unconstitutional Special Law
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part on a frequently overlooked section of Casey that rejected compelled speech
claims of physicians: "To be sure, the physician's First Amendment rights not to
speak are implicated, but only as part of the practice of medicine subject to
reasonable licensing and regulation by the State.' 4 Drawing on Casey and the
Court's subsequent decision in Gonzales v. Carhart,5 the Fifth Circuit rejected
the physicians' compelled speech claims, applying a form of rational basis
review. 16
In December 2014, the Fourth Circuit issued its opinion in Stuart v.
Camnitz, affirming the district court's order that permanently enjoined North
Carolina's speech-and-display provision.
Contrary to the Fifth Circuit, the
Stuart panel applied heightened scrutiny to the physicians' compelled speech
claims.1 9 Even though North Carolina required doctors to convey only factual
information relating to the sonogram images, the Stuart panel concluded the
disclosures amounted to ideological speech that triggered at least intermediate
scrutiny under the First Amendment.20 As a result, Stuart created a circuit split,
and in the process highlighted several areas of uncertainty that have developed
regarding Casey's analysis of compelled speech claims in the medical context.21
Given this uncertainty and the fact that the North Carolina Attorney General
has filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in Stuart, this Article explores the new
circuit conflict emphasizing the central points of contention between the Fourth
and Fifth Circuits. In particular, the first section analyzes both the Fourth
Circuit's argument that Casey requires courts to apply at least intermediate
22
scrutiny to the physicians' compelled speech claims and the Fifth Circuit's
contrary conclusion that Casey imposes only a rational basis review on speechand-display laws. 23 The second section critically evaluates this circuit split,
exploring the key areas of disagreement between the Fourth and Fifth Circuits
that the Supreme Court will have to resolve if it takes the case and that other
circuits should consider when addressing similar compelled speech claims in the
medical context.

and Permanent Injunction Preventing the Enforcement of the Ultrasound Act, Nova Health Sys. v.
Pruitt, No. CV-2010-533 (Okla. Cnty. Dist. Ct. Mar. 28, 2012).
14. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1991) (citations omitted).
15. 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
16. See Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 575 (5th
Cir. 2012).
17. See Stuart, 774 F.3d at 242.
18. See Lakey, 667 F.3dat 575.
19. See Stuart, 774 F.3d at 248 (citing Stuart v. Loomis, 992 F. Supp. 2d. 585, 600
(M.D.N.C. 2014)).
20. See id. at 245.
21. See id.;Lakey, 667 F.3dat 575.
22. See Stuart, 774 F.3d at 248.
23. See Lakey, 667 F.3dat 575.
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THE CIRCUIT CONFLICT-THE FOURTH, FIFTH, AND EIGHTH CIRCUITS TRY
TO DISCERN THE PROPER STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR SPEECH-AND-DISPLAY
LAWS.

As the Fourth Circuit notes in Stuart, the First Amendment protects against
24
restrictions on speech as well as regulations that compel speech.
In the words
of Wooley v. Maynard, "the First Amendment ... includes both the right to
speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all." 25 But the Court also
has "long recognized that not all speech is of equal First Amendment
importance." 26 Thus, to acknowledge that speech-and-display laws implicate the
First Amendment rights of physicians does not automatically determine the level
of scrutiny to apply to such claims. As the Court explained in Riley v. National
Federation of the Blind, Inc.,27 the proper standard of review to apply to a
compelled speech claim depends on the context of the speech: "Our lodestars in
deciding what level of scrutiny to apply to a compelled statement must be the
nature of the speech taken as a whole and the effect of the compelled statement
thereon." 28 Thus, under Riley, the level of scrutiny for speech-and-display laws
trades on the nature of the patient-physician communications in the medical
context29 and the effect of the mandated disclosures on those communications.
Casey confirms this analysis, albeit in a short, succinct discussion. Although
best known for articulating the undue burden test in relation to a Fourteenth
Amendment due process claim, Casey also considered and rejected the claim that
Pennsylvania's compelled disclosures violated the First Amendment rights of
physicians. 30 That is, Casey considered and resolved a compelled speech claim
in the context of "the practice of medicine." 31 As a result, Casey is a natural
starting point when considering the constitutionality of speech-and-display laws.
Unfortunately though, Casey's direct discussion of compelled speech is
limited to a single paragraph in which the plurality states that "the physician's
First Amendment rights not to speak are implicated, but only as part of the
practice of medicine, subject to reasonable licensing and regulation by the

24. See Stuart, 774 F.3d at 245.
25. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977); see also Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay,
Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 573 (1995) (quoting Pac. Gas Elec. Co. v. Pub.
Util. Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 16 (1986)) ("[O]ne important manifestation of the principle of
free speech is that one who chooses to speak may also decide 'what not to say."').
26. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758 (1985).
27. 487 U.S. 781 (1988).
28. Id. at 796; see Stuart, 774 F.3d at 244 ("Laws that impinge upon speech receive different
levels of judicial scrutiny depending on the type of regulation and the justifications and purposes
underlying it.").
29. See Riley, 487 U.S. at 797-98; Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
884 (1991) ("Thus, a requirement that a doctor give a woman certain information as part of
obtaining her consent to an abortion is, for constitutional purposes, no different from a requirement
that a doctor give certain specific information about any medical procedure.").
30. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 884.
3 1. Id.
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State." 32 While certainly important to the speech-and-display provision at issue
in Lakey and Stuart, Casey's discussion has left unresolved several important
questions that have divided the circuit courts.

33

What level of scrutiny does

Casey apply to compelled disclosures? Are the disclosures in Casey of the same
kind as speech-and-display disclosures such that the same standard should
apply? Does the standard change if the disclosures are ideological? And if so,
are descriptions of sonograms ideological or factual? Should the professional
speech doctrine or the Court's Zauderer34 decision affect the analysis? And if
so, how? How does Casey's35 reference to Whalen36 impact the analysis?
Texas's and North Carolina's speech-and-display laws required the Fourth
and Fifth Circuits to address these questions directly. And, as it turns out, these
circuit courts reached significantly different answers, creating a circuit conflict
that only the Supreme Court can resolve.
A.

Stuart v. Camnitz: The Casefor HeightenedScrutiny

In 2011, the North Carolina General Assembly passed the Woman's Right to
Know Act (the "Act"), 37 which as the title suggests was part of the state's
informed consent requirements. 38 The speech-and-display provisions in the Act
augmented the Casey-like disclosures that the state already mandated and that
were not challenged in the speech-and-display litigation. 39 Thus, the panel had
to explain why the speech-and-display disclosures-which the Fourth Circuit
assumed "'are the epitome of truthful, non-misleading information"' 40-should
be treated differently from the disclosures in Casey.

32. Id. (citation omitted)
33. Compare Stuart, 774 F.3d at 245 (applying an intermediate scrutiny standard to
compelled speech under the First Amendment), with Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion
Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 576 (5th Cir. 2012) (holding that the regulation of medical practice
does not compel ideological speech that triggers First Amendment strict scrutiny).
34. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626 (1985)
(restricting commercial speech by an attorney in his advertisements).
35. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 884.
36. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 603 (1977).
37. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-21.80 to -21.92 (2013).
38. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.82.
39. Consistent with the disclosures in Casey, North Carolina Section 90-21.82 requires a
doctor or qualified professional, at least 24 hours before a scheduled abortion, to (i) explain the risks
of the procedure, the risks of carrying the fetus to term, and possible adverse psychological effects
associated with abortion; (ii) convey the probably gestational age of the fetus; (iii) inform the
woman that financial assistance for the pregnancy may be available, that the father may be obligated
to pay child support, and that there are alternatives to abortion; and (iv) tell the woman that the state
has a website on which she can view materials describing the fetus and offer to give or send the
materials to her. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.82; see also Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 243-44
(4th Cir. 2014) (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.82) (discussing various provisions of North
Carolina's informed consent statute).
40. Stuart, 774 F.3d at 246 (quoting Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v.
Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 577-78 (5th Cir. 2012)).
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Although Casey considered and rejected a compelled speech claim,4' the
Stuart panel neither started nor finished with Casey. Rather, the panel limited
Casey to its facts, relegating its First Amendment analysis to a "particularized
finding" that related only to "the information mandated by the state here." 42
According to the Fourth Circuit, Casey did not "announce[ ] a guiding standard
of scrutiny for use in every subsequent compelled speech case involving
abortion."43 Consequently, the Fourth Circuit looked to the context of the
disclosures to determine the proper level of scrutiny: "Laws that impinge upon
speech receive different levels of judicial scrutiny depending on the type of
regulation and the justifications and purposes underlying it." 44 Not surprisingly,
the parties disagreed as to the proper level of scrutiny to apply in the context of
compelled disclosures related to abortion.45 The physicians argued for strict
scrutiny "because [the regulation] is content-based and ideological," while the
state advocated for rational basis "as a regulation of the medical profession in the
context of abortion."46 The Fourth Circuit disagreed with both parties and
instead took a middle ground, concluding that North Carolina's speech-anddisplay requirement "is a content-based regulation of a medical professional's
speech which must satisfy at least intermediate scrutiny to survive." 47
The Fourth Circuit settled on intermediate scrutiny after considering the
nature of the speech as well as the state's right to regulate the medical
profession.48 According to the panel, there was no question that the disclosure
"is quintessential compelled speech [because i]t forces physicians to say things
they otherwise would not say."49 Making matters worse for the state, "the
statement compelled here is ideological; it conveys a particular opinion', 50 and
seeks to dissuade women from having an abortion by presenting "facts that all
fall on one side of the abortion debate-and does so shortly before the time of
decision when the intended recipient is most vulnerable."' Under the Fourth

41. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1991) ("All that is left of
petitioners' argument is an asserted First Amendment right of a physician not to provide
information about the risks of abortion, and childbirth, in a manner mandated by the State . . .. We
see no constitutional infirmity in the requirement that the physician provide the information
mandated by the State here.").
42. Stuart, 774 F.3d at 249 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 884).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 244.
45. Id. at 245.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 246; see Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557,
573 (1995) (quoting Pac. Gas Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 11, 16 (1986))
(." Since all speech inherently involves choices of what to say and what to leave unsaid,' one
important manifestation of the principle of free speech is that one who chooses to speak may also
decide 'what not to say."').
50. Stuart, 774 F.3d at 246.
51. Id.
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Circuit's interpretation, the fact that the disclosures "are factual . . . does not

divorce the speech from its moral or ideological implications" 52 because the state
sought to dissuade the woman from having an abortion. Moreover, the fact that
North Carolina's speech-and-display law allows doctors to express their own
views on abortion and the speech-and-display requirement "does not cure the
coercion-the government's message still must be delivered (though not
necessarily received)."5 3 Thus, the panel concluded that North Carolina's
speech-and-display provision was a strong candidate for strict scrutiny even
though the plurality did not apply that standard in Casey.54
In response, the state argued that, given its broad authority to regulate the
medical profession, only rational basis scrutiny should apply.
According to
North Carolina, it could "require the provision of information sufficient for
patients to give their informed consent to medical procedures" even when the
profession involves speech activity.56
Although the Fourth Circuit
acknowledged that North Carolina has authority to regulate the practice of
medicine, it emphasized that its right is not boundless.
Given that "[t]here are
'many dimensions' to professionals' speech," 58 Stuart noted that it "must look to
the context of the regulation to determine when the state's regulatory authority
has extended too far." 59 Drawing on the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Pickup v.
Brown,60 the Fourth Circuit panel contended that the protection afforded to the
First Amendment rights of professionals "slides 'along a continuum' from
'public dialogue' on the one end to 'regulation of professional conduct' on the
other." 6 1 North Carolina's speech-and-display requirement rested somewhere in
the middle, regulating the treatment of patients as well as compelling physicians
"to 'say' as well as 'do."' 62 Thus, because North Carolina regulated both speech
and conduct, its disclosures fell in the middle of the continuum and warranted at
63
least intermediate scrutiny.
Having settled on the proper level of scrutiny, the Fourth Circuit considered
whether North Carolina had an important interest in requiring disclosures

52. Id. See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 573 (stating that an individual's "right to tailor [his] speech
applies . . . equally to statement of fact the speaker would rather avoid").
53. Stuart, 774 F.3d at 246.
54. See generally N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.82 (requiring voluntary and informed consent to
prior to abortion).
55. See Stuart, 774 F.3d at 245.
56. Id. at 247.
57. Id. (citing Riley, 487 U.S. at 796-97).
58. Id. (quoting Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 634 (1995)).
59. Id. (citing Riley, 487 U.S. at 796-97).
60. 740 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2013).
61. Stuart, 774 F.3d at 248 (quoting Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1227, 1229).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 245. The Fourth Circuit does not feel compelled to resolve whether strict or
intermediate scrutiny should apply because "the outcome is the same whether a special commercial
speech inquiry or a stricter form of judicial scrutiny is applied." Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S.
Ct. 2653, 2667 (2011).
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relating to the sonogram images and whether the speech-and-display requirement
was substantially related to that interest.64 The first inquiry was relatively
straightforward.
Because the Court "has repeatedly affirmed the state's
'important and legitimate interest' in preserving, promoting, and protecting fetal
life ,65 the panel presumed that the state had an important interest in passing the
speech-and-display requirement. Consistent with the Supreme Court's analysis
in Gonzales, "[t]he government may use its voice and its regulatory authority to
show its profound respect for the life within the woman."66
But the Fourth Circuit denied that the provision was properly tailored.
According to the panel, North Carolina's speech-and-display disclosure
requirement "interferes with the physician's right to free speech beyond the
extent permitted for reasonable regulation of the medical profession, while
simultaneously threatening harm to the patient's psychological health, interfering
with the physician's professional judgment, and compromising the doctor-patient
relationship."67 Although the state may require informed consent, the panel
concluded that North Carolina's speech-and-consent provision went far beyond
Casey or traditional informed consent requirements and actually undermined
rather than promoted other important state interests.68
According to Stuart, the most egregious variation from traditional informed
consent provisions resulted from the state's requiring physicians to show and to
describe the ultrasound image "to a woman who has through ear and eye
covering rendered herself temporarily deaf and blind."69 In such cases, the
woman could not be informed because she would never receive the information.
And even if presenting the information "may in some remote way influence a
woman in favor of carrying the child to term," such a requirement "does not bear
the constitutionally necessary connection to the protection of fetal life. 70 In
fact, the panel suggested that providing the information "risks the infliction of
psychological harm on the woman who chooses not to receive [it]." 7 '

Because

North Carolina's speech-and-display provision did not have a therapeutic
exception that would allow physicians to forego or delay the explanation if
giving the information at a specific time might physically or psychologically
harm the woman, it "runs contrary to the state's interest in 'protecting the
integrity and ethics of the medical profession' and more generally to its interest
in the psychological and physical well-being of the affected women." 72

64. See Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2667-68 (holding that intermediate scrutiny puts the burden on
the government to show "at least that the statute directly advances a substantial governmental
interest and that the measure is drawn to achieve that interest").
65. Stuart, 774 F.3d at 250 (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973)).
66. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 157 (2007).
67. Stuart, 774 F.3d at 250.
68. Id. at 252 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.85 (2013)).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 253.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 254 (quoting Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 157).
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The Fourth Circuit's concerns were aggravated by the context in which the
information is given-"the patient [is] half-naked or disrobed on her back on an
examination table, with an ultrasound probe either on her belly or inserted into
her vagina." 73 Given that the disclosures occurred during the sonogram, the state
was trying to "convey . . . the full weight of the state's moral condemnation." 74
While the state has a right to express its preference for childbirth over abortion,
the Fourth Circuit concluded that North Carolina could not "require a physician
to deliver the state's preference in a setting this fraught with stress and
anxiety."
Thus, under the Fourth Circuit's view, the informed consent
provision compelled physicians to transmit the state's ideological message under
circumstances that interfered with the doctor-patient relationship and might
actually harm the woman, North Carolina's speech-and-display provision did not
76
properly advance the state's important interest in protecting fetal life.
The
panel, therefore, concluded that North Carolina's speech-and-display provision
violated the First Amendment rights of physicians.
B.

The Fifth and Eighth Circuits: The Casefor RationalBasis Review

In applying heightened scrutiny to North Carolina's speech-and-display
provision, the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that its analysis conflicted with the
Fifth and Eighth Circuits, which applied rational basis to informed consent
78
provisions related to abortion. In particular, the Stuart panel disagreed with the
emphasis that its sister circuits placed on the single paragraph in Casey
addressing the physicians' compelled speech claim. 79 Having rejected the due
process claim, the plurality in Casey explained:
All that is left of petitioners' argument is an asserted First Amendment
right of a physician not to provide information about the risks of
abortion, and childbirth, in a manner mandated by the State. To be sure,
the physician's First Amendment rights not to speak are
implicated, ... but only as part of the practice of medicine, subject to
reasonable

licensing

and regulation

by the State,

. .

. We see no

constitutional infirmity in the requirement that the physician provide the
information mandated by the State here.so

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
Fifth and
79.
80.

Id. at 255.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 256.
See generally id. at 245, 248 (applying intermediate scrutiny in disagreement with the
Eight Circuits).
Id. at 248.
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992).
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Because the Fourth Circuit limited Casey to its facts, this solitary paragraph
neither deprived physicians of their First Amendment rights nor pronounced the
standard of review for regulations "that compel speech to the extraordinary
extent present here." 8' According to Stuart, rather than "hold sweepingly that all
regulation of speech in the medical context merely receives rational basis
review," Casey "simply stated that it saw 'no constitutional infirmity in the
requirement that the physician provide the information mandated by the State
here."'82

Yet even under the Fourth Circuit's own summary of the Fifth and Eighth
Circuits' opinions, it is not clear that these circuits attempt to "announce[ ] a
guiding standard of scrutiny for use in every subsequent compelled speech case
involving abortion." 83 As Stuart noted, the Fifth Circuit determined that speechand-display provisions "'do not fall under the rubric of compelling "ideological
speech" that triggers First Amendment strict scrutiny' because such laws
"'require truthful, nonmisleading, and relevant disclosures."' 84 Drawing on
Casey and Gonzales, the Eighth Circuit reached the same conclusion in relation
to a statute that required "the disclosure to patients seeking abortions of an
'[i]ncreased risk of suicide ideation and suicide.' 8 5 The Eighth Circuit held that
a state may "use its regulatory authority to require a physician to provide
truthful, non-misleading information relevant to a patient's decision to have an
,,86
abortion.
Under the Fifth and Eighth Circuits' analysis, heightened scrutiny
might apply if the government compels physicians to disclose information that is
false, misleading, or irrelevant. Consequently, the conflict between the circuits
is more nuanced than Stuart suggests. To fully understand the circuit split, one
must look closely at the nature of the compelled speech at issue in Lakey and
Rounds and its relationship to the required disclosures in Casey.
In Lakey, the Fifth Circuit considered the constitutionality of Texas's
speech-and-display law, which was styled as an act "relating to informed consent
to an abortion." 89 Like North Carolina's Act, 90 Texas's speech-and-display law
amended Texas's 2003 Woman's Right to Know Act, which imposed

81. Stuart, 774 F.3d at 249.
82. Id. (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 884) (citation omitted).
83. Id.
84. Id. (quoting Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570,
576 (5th Cir. 2012)).
85. Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds (Rounds II), 686 F.3d 889, 892 (8th Cir.
2012) (en banc).
86. Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds (Rounds 1), 530 F.3d 724, 734-35 (8th
Cir. 2008) (en banc).
87. See Lakey, 667 F.3d at 576; Rounds II, 686 F.3d at 893 (quoting Rounds I, 530 F.3d at
735).
88. See Stuart, 774 F.3d at 248-49 (quoting Lakey, 667 F.3d at 575-76; Rounds I, 530 F.3d
at 734-35).
89. Lakey, 667 F.3d at 572 (citing H.B. 15, 82d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2011)).
90. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.82(b) (2013).
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requirements similar to those found in Casey.91 Pursuant to Texas's speech-anddisplay provision, a woman's consent to an abortion was deemed informed and
voluntary only if the physician "who is to perform the abortion" did the
following: (i) performed a sonogram; (ii) displayed the sonogram images so that
the woman may view them; (iii) made the heartbeat of the fetus audible for the
woman to hear; and (iv) explained "in a manner understandable to a layperson"
the results of the sonogram and heart auscultation.92 Under Texas's law, a
woman could decline to view the sonogram images or to hear the fetal
heartbeat,9 3 but could refuse to listen to the explanation of the sonogram images
only if she certified that her pregnancy fell into one of three statutory exceptions,
which included sexual assault and incest. 94
Plaintiffs challenged the Texas statute on First and Fourteenth Amendment
grounds, and the district court found that Texas's speech-and-display
requirement violated the First Amendment rights of physicians.95 On appeal, the
Fifth Circuit reversed,96 concluding that Texas's informed consent provisions
furthered at least two legitimate goals under Casey.97 First, such statutes
"further[] the legitimate end of 'ensur[ing] that a woman apprehend the full
consequences of her decision .

.

. [thereby] reducing the risk that a woman may

elect an abortion, only to discover later, with devastating psychological
consequences, that her decision was not fully informed."' 98 Second, the
informed consent statute promoted the state's "'legitimate goal of protecting the
life of the unborn' through 'legislation aimed at ensuring a decision that is
mature and informed, even when in doing so the state expresses a preference for
childbirth over abortion."' 99 According to the Fifth Circuit, the Court viewed
these state interests as sufficient to defeat the physicians' compelled speech
claims in Casey because Pennsylvania's informed consent requirements
00
constituted "reasonable . . . regulation by the State."'

Applying the same analysis to Texas's speech-and-display provision, the

91. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.012(a)(1)(B) (West Supp. II 2012)
(requiring the doctor to provide information regarding the risks of having an abortion prior to
performing one); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992).
92. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.012(a)(4).
93. Id. § 171.0122(b)-(c).
94. See id. § 171.0122(d).
95. Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 572 (5th Cir.
2012).
96. Id.
97. See id. at 580.
98. Id. at 575 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882
(1992)).
99. Id. (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 883); see also id. at 576 (quoting Gonzales v. Carhart,
550 U.S. 124, 160 (2007)) (noting that Carhartalso recognized that "[t]he State's interest in respect
for life is advanced by the dialogue that better informs the political and legal systems, the medical
profession, expectant mothers, and society as a whole of the consequences that follow from a
decision to elect a late-term abortion")
100. Casey, 505 U.S. at 884 (citations omitted).
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Fifth Circuit concluded that heightened scrutiny was inconsistent with Casey.101
Rather than subject Pennsylvania's informed consent statute to such rigorous
02
review, the plurality's analysis was "the antithesis of strict scrutiny."'1
Pennsylvania's compelled speech requirements were "part of the practice of
medicine" and, as such, were constitutional as "reasonable licensing and
regulation by the State."1 03 Moreover, contrary to the Fourth Circuit's claim, the
Fifth Circuit did not take Texas's speech-and-display requirement to "fall under
the rubric of compelling 'ideological' speech that triggers First Amendment
strict scrutiny."1 04 Although the state sought to exercise its right under Casey to
promote childbirth over abortion, Texas required the disclosure of only truthful,
nonmisleading information regarding the risks of abortion as well as the status of
the fetus. o0 According to Lakey, the information was factual-not ideologicaland promoted the state's interests in making sure that the woman's choice was
fully informed and in promoting childbirth over abortion.106
Contrary to the Fourth Circuit, the Fifth Circuit distinguished between the
state's intent in passing its speech-and-display law and the content of the
required disclosure. 0 7 While the former might be "ideological" in the sense that
the state sought (consistent with Casey) to promote childbirth over abortion, the
latter was not. 08 The means chosen-the display and description of the image
of the fetus at the time of the ultrasound-involved truthful, nonmisleading facts
that, from the state's perspective, directly related to a woman's decision whether
to terminate her pregnancy.1 09 Moreover, the Fifth Circuit noted that its opinion
was consistent with the Eighth Circuit's analysis of a similar informed consent
statute."1 0 In Planned ParenthoodMinnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota v.
Rounds, the Eighth Circuit sitting en banc considered a First Amendment
challenge to an informed consent provision that, among other things, required
physicians to disclose that "the abortion 'will terminate the life of a whole,
separate, unique, living human being' with whom the woman 'has an existing
relationship' entitled to legal protection""' Drawing on Casey and Gonzales,

101. Lackey, 667 F.3d at 575.
102. Id.
103. Id. (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 884).
104. Id. at 576.
105. Id.; see also TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.012 (West Supp. II 2012)
(requiring physician to give requisite information for informed consent to an abortion).
106. Lackey, 667 F.3d at 576; see Casey, 505 U.S. at 872 ("Even in the earliest stages of
pregnancy, the State may enact rules and regulations designed to encourage her to know that there
are philosophic and social arguments of great weight that can be brought to bear in favor of
continuing the pregnancy to full term .... ).
107. Compare Lackey, 667 F.3d at 578-79, 584 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 871), with Casey,
505 U.S. at 877 (discussing what is and is not medically necessary and required to be disclosed).
108. See Lackey, 667 F.3d at 574.
109. Id. at 575 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 882-83).
110. Id. at 576-77 (discussing Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds (Rounds 1),
530 F.3d 724, 726, 734-35, 741 (8th Cir. 2008) (en banc)).
111. Lakey, 667 F.3d at 577 (quoting Rounds I, 530 F.3d at 726).
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the Eighth Circuit concluded that:
[W]hile the State cannot compel an individual simply to speak the
State's ideological message, it can use its regulatory authority to require
a physician to provide truthful, non-misleading information relevant to a
patient's decision to have an abortion, even if that information might
also encourage the patient to choose childbirth over abortion.112
The Fifth Circuit noted that Texas's disclosure requirements were not as
extensive as the Minnesota statute at issue in Rounds because they were limited
to "medically accurate depictions [that] are inherently truthful and nonmisleading." The Fifth Circuit, therefore, concluded that Rounds and Casey
precluded the physicians' First Amendment challenge.11 3 Although Texas's
speech-and-display provision required doctors to give information that was
"more graphic and scientifically up-to-date[ ] than the disclosures discussed in
Casey," "[it is] not different in kind."' 14 According to the Fifth Circuit, to hold
otherwise would permit doctors to use the First Amendment to "essentially
trump the balance Casey struck between women's rights and the states'
prerogatives."''

5

In addition, the Fifth Circuit considered the claim, which the district court in
Lakey and the Fourth Circuit in Stuart both made, that speech-and-display
requirements differ in two material ways from the disclosures upheld in Casey:
(1) the descriptions "of the sonogram and fetal heartbeat are 'medically
unnecessary' . . . and therefore beyond the standard practice of medicine within

the state's regulatory powers," and (2) instead of simply requiring physicians to
make certain information available to women seeking to have an abortion, these
provisions require physicians to provide-and women to hear an explanation
of the sonogram, thereby making doctors the "mouthpiece" of the state's
ideological preferences.116 The Fifth Circuit concluded that neither distinction
made a constitutional difference." 7
With respect to the claim that the
disclosures went beyond standard medical practice, the Fifth Circuit determined
that Casey and Gonzales did not limit the scope of permissible disclosures to
those in Casey.
Rather, these cases interpreted medically relevant disclosures
broadly to include information relating to the physical and psychological health
of the mother as well as the impact of the abortion decision on the potential

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
elements
rendering
to protect
117.
118.

Rounds I, 530 F.3d at 734-35.
Id.
Id. at 578.
Id. at 577.
Id. at 578-79; see Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 254 (4th Cir. 2014) ("The three
discussed so far requiring the physician to speak to a patient who is not listening,
the physician the mouthpiece of the state's message, and omitting a therapeutic privilege
the health of the patient markedly depart from standard medical practice.").
Lakey, 667 F.3d at 580.
Id. at 580 n.9.
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life.1 9 According to the Fifth Circuit, Casey and Gonzales "emphasize that the
gravity of the decision may be the subject of informed consent through factual,
medical detail, that the condition of the fetus is relevant, and that discouraging
abortion is an acceptable effect of mandated disclosures."120
Given that
informed consent laws, including speech-and-display provisions, are meant to
help a woman make the "best decision under difficult circumstances[, d]enying
her up to date medical information is more of an abuse to her ability to decide
than providing the information."121
Similarly, Lakey rejected the claim that speech-and-display provisions are
unconstitutional because they require physicians to discuss the ultrasound with
the patient instead of merely letting her know how to obtain information
regarding the abortion procedure.1 22 The First Amendment challenge in Casey
was directed at "the provision of specific information by the doctor,"123 not at the
particular method used to convey that information.124 Under the Fifth Circuit's
interpretation, the context of the compelled speech-not the particular mode of
expression-was constitutionally significant.
Casey upheld Pennsylvania's
requirement that "doctors . . . describe verbally the fetus's gestational age, a
description which the Casey plurality acknowledged was relevant to 'informed
consent' only in a sense broad enough to include the potential impact on the
fetus." 25 As Casey explained:
Nor can it be doubted that most women considering an abortion would
deem the impact on the fetus relevant, if not dispositive, to the decision.
In attempting to ensure that a woman apprehend the full consequences
of her decision, the State furthers the legitimate purpose of reducing the
risk that a woman may elect an abortion, only to discover later, with
devastating psychological consequences, that her decision was not fully
informed.1 26
Thus, because Casey expressly upheld oral disclosures in the context of
informed consent, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the fact that a speech-anddisplay provision's "method of delivering this information is direct and
powerful,... does not make a constitutionally significant difference from the
27
'availability' provision in Casey."1

119. Id. at 576 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 871, 882
(1992)).
120. Id. at 579.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 881 (1992).
124. Lakey, 667 F.3d at 580 ("The mode of compelled expression is not by itself
constitutionally relevant, although the context is [relevant].").
125. Lakey, 667 F.3d at 580 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 883).
126. Casey, 505 U.S. at 882.
127. Lakey, 667 F.3d at 579.
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III. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT AND THE FIFTH AND EIGHTH
CIRCUITS RAISES

FOUR

NOVEL

QUESTIONS

REGARDING

COMPELLED

PHYSICIAN SPEECH

As the Fourth Circuit acknowledges, the newly created circuit split regarding
speech-and-display laws is predicated in large measure on differing
interpretations of Casey.128 In dismissing the compelled speech claims of
physicians, the plurality concluded that "the physician's First Amendment rights
not to speak are implicated, but only as part of the practice of medicine, subject
to reasonable licensing and regulation by the State." 29 While the Fourth Circuit
viewed the disclosures as content-based regulations of speech and conduct that
warranted at least intermediate scrutiny, 30 the Fifth Circuit took Casey to apply
"the antithesis of strict scrutiny" 131 and applied rational basis.1 32
Yet neither circuit court relied exclusively on Casey, nor should they have.
As Casey explained, "a requirement that a doctor give a woman certain
information as part of obtaining her consent to an abortion is, for constitutional
purposes, no different from a requirement that a doctor give certain specific
information about any medical procedure. '133 Similarly, in Gonzales the Court
confirmed that the state does not lose the ability to regulate the practice of
medicine simply because the regulation relates to abortion: "The law need not
give abortion doctors unfettered choice in the course of their medical practice,
nor should it elevate their status above other physicians in the medical
community."1 34 Thus, speech-and-display laws implicate a broader question
regarding a state's authority to regulate professional speech generally.1 35 If the
government can require disclosures in other contexts, is there something unique
about the medical context that demands a different result? Or given that a state
"has a significant role to play in regulating the medical profession,"'136 can it
require truthful, nonmisleading disclosures to "ensur[e] a decision that is mature

128. See Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 249 (4th Cir. 2014).
129. Casey, 505 U.S. at 884.
130. Stuart, 774 F.3d at 245.
131. Lakey, 667 F.3d at 575.
132 The disagreement surrounding Casey's impact on mandatory disclosures in the medical
context extends to state supreme courts. In Nova Health Sys. v. Pruitt, 292 P.3d 28 (Okla. 2012),
cert.den. 134 S. Ct. 617 (2013), the Oklahoma Supreme Court struck down Oklahoma's speechand-display law in a short, three paragraph decision, claiming that in Casey "the United States
Supreme Court has previously determined the dispositive issue presented in this matter." Id. at 28.
Consequently, there is a three way conflict among the courts that have analyzed speech-and-display
laws. The Fifth Circuit takes Casey to support such mandatory disclosures, the Oklahoma Supreme
Court interprets Casey as precluding such compelled statements, and the Fourth Circuit denies that
Casey applies at all.
133. Casey, 505 U.S. at 884.
134. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 163 (2007).
135. See id. at 159-60 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 873).
136. Id. at 157.
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and informed"?1 37 To answer these question, though, the Supreme Court (or
other circuit courts if the Supreme Court does not grant North Carolina's petition
for certiorari) will have to consider at least four other issues that bear directly on
the proper standard of review for speech-and-display laws: (i) whether the
professional speech doctrine applies to regulations of the patient-physician
relationship, (ii) whether Zauderer applies to compelled disclosures outside the
commercial speech context,138 (iii) whether truthful, nonmisleading disclosures
are ideological,1 39 and (iv) what impact Casey's invocation of Whalen v. Roe
should have on the scrutiny analysis.1 40
A.

The ProfessionalSpeech Doctrine

The professional speech doctrine recognizes that states have an important
role to play in regulating professionals, even when those professions involve
speech.141 As Justice White noted in his concurrence in Lowe v. S.E.C., the First
Amendment does not insulate all professional speech from regulation: "The
power of government to regulate the professions is not lost whenever the practice
of a profession entails speech."1 42 Although states have greater authority to
compel factual disclosures in professional-client communications, as Justice
Jackson noted in Thomas v. Collins they cannot restrict the rights of
professionals, such as physicians, to speak generally about the practice of
medicine or "make it a crime publicly or privately to speak urging persons to
follow or reject any school of medical thought." 143 Yet, even though the
doctrine traces its roots back to Justice Jackson and Justice White, the Supreme
Court has never adopted the doctrine, leaving circuit courts to fashion the limits
'44
of the doctrine on their own.
As Stuart demonstrates, the circuit courts have adopted fundamentally
different versions of the professional speech doctrine. Having attempted to
distinguish Casey, the Stuart panel relies on the professional speech doctrine to
support is use of heightened scrutiny. In so doing, though, the Fourth Circuit
generates additional conflicts with (i) the Third, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits,

137. Casey, 505 U.S. at 883.
138. See generally Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S.
626, 651 (1985) (discussing the implications of disclosure requirements on First Amendment
rights).
139. See Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 576 (5th
Cir. 2012).
140. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 884 (citing Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 603 (1977)).
141. Lowe v. S.E.C., 472 U.S. 181, 228 (1985) (White, J., concurring).
142. Id.
143. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 545 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring).
144. See Lowe, 472 U.S. at 228 (Justice White concurring); Thomas, 323 U.S. at 544 (Justice
Jackson concurring); see also David Halberstam, Commercial Speech, ProfessionalSpeech, and the
Constitutional Status of Social Institutions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 771, 834-44 (1999) (citations
omitted) (providing an overview of the development of the professional speech doctrine).
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which hold that factual nonmisleading disclosures in the context of professionalclient communications are subject to rational basis review, as well as (ii) its own
professional speech precedents.
Because the Fourth Circuit denies that Casey establishes the proper level of
scrutiny, the panel invokes the professional speech doctrine as developed in the
Third, Ninth, an Eleventh Circuits to support its application of heightened
scrutiny to North Carolina's speech-and-display provision.1 45 Specifically, the
Stuart panel relies on Pickup to show that the level of scrutiny applicable to
regulations of professionals "slides 'along a continuum' from 'pubic dialogue'
on one end to 'regulation of professional conduct' on the other."'1 46 Because
speech-and-display laws "require[] doctors to 'say' as well as 'do,"' the panel
concluded that such disclosures fall somewhere in the middle of continuum and,
therefore, warranted as least "a heightened intermediate scrutiny standard used in
certain commercial speech cases." 47
The Fourth Circuit's interpretation of the professional speech doctrine,
however, is inconsistent with the development of that doctrine in other circuits.
As the Third Circuit acknowledges, "our sister circuits have concluded that
regulations of professional speech are subject to a more deferential standard of
review or, possibly, no review at all."1 48 While ultimately applying heightened
scrutiny to a speech prohibition, the Third Circuit recognized-contrary to the
Fourth Circuit-that Casey and Zauderer applied rational basis review to "a
special category of laws that compel disclosure of truthful factual
information."149 Although recognizing that "the information conveyed may be
strictly factual," Stuart did not attempt to distinguish the Third Circuit's analysis
of Casey and Zauderer, citing King only for the general proposition that
"distinction between professional speech and professional conduct when
deciding on the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply to regulations of the
50
medical profession."1

Moreover, the Fourth Circuit's use of heightened scrutiny also conflicts with
the Ninth Circuit's analysis in Pickup. Although the central issue in Pickup was
"whether [the law was] a regulation of speech or conduct,"' 5 ' the Ninth Circuit's
analysis is more nuanced than the Fourth Circuit suggests. Pickup distinguishes
between types of professional speech as well as between speech and conduct.
According to the Ninth Circuit, the proper level of scrutiny to apply to
professional speech depends on whether the professional's speech is public or

145. See King v. Gov. of N.J., 767 F.3d 216 (3d Cir. 2014); Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208
(9th Cir. 2013); and Wollschlaeger v. Gov. ofFla., 760 F.3d 1195 (11th Cir. 2014).
146. Stuart, 774 F.3d at 248 (quoting Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1227, 1229 (9th
Cir.2013)).
147. Id.
148. King, 767 F.3d at 235.
149. Id.
150. Stuart, 774 F.3d at 247 (citing King, 767 F.3d at 229).
151. Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1227.
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private. When "a professional is engaged in a public dialogue, First Amendment
protection is at its greatest."1 52 But the standard is relaxed considerably when
professionals engage in speech with their clients:
[T]he First Amendment tolerates a substantial amount of speech
regulation within the professional-client relationship that it would not
tolerate outside of it.
And that toleration makes sense: When
professionals, by means of their state-issued licenses, form relationships
with clients, the purpose of those relationships is to advance the welfare
of the clients, rather than to contribute to public debate.1 53
In fact, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the compelled disclosures in Casey
required only "diminished" protection, which is why the plurality upheld the
54
disclosures as "'reasonable licensing and regulation by the State."1
Consequently, because the regulation in Pickup left "mental health providers free
to discuss and recommend, or recommend against, SOCE, we conclude that any
effect it may have on free speech is merely incidental . . . [and] hold that SB

1172 is subject to only rational basis review."15 5
The Fourth Circuit's invocation of the Eleventh Circuit's recent decision in
Wollschlaeger v. Governor of the State of Floridal56fares no better. Stuart cites
Wollschlaeger to support its claim that "[o]ther circuits have recently relied on
the distinction between professional speech and professional conduct when
deciding on the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply to regulations of the
medical profession."15 7 But the Eleventh Circuit follows the Ninth Circuit in
recognizing that the proper level of review for regulations of professional speech
depends on the public or private nature of the professional's speech: "These
[First Amendment] protections are at their apex when a professional speaks to
the public on matters of public concern; they approach a nadir, however, when
the professional speaks privately, in the course of exercising his or her
professional judgment, to a person receiving the professional's services.", 5 8
Rather than apply heightened scrutiny, the Eleventh Circuit applied little or no

152. Id.; see also Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1215 (2011) (quoting Dun & Broadstreet,
Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758-59 (1985)) ("[S]peech on 'matters of public
concern' . . . is 'at the heart of the First Amendment's protection.').
153. Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1228.
154. Id. (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 884) (emphasis in Pickup).
155. Id. at 1231
156. 760 F.2d 1195 (11th Cir. 2014).
157. Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 248 (4th Cir. 2014).
158. Wollschlaeger, 760 F.3d at 1218; see also id. at 1221 (noting that "[a]lthough we accept
that firearm safety may be a matter of public concern," there was no First Amendment violation "in
the context of a regulation of professional conduct that provides that the privacy of a physician's
examination room is not an appropriate forum for unrestricted debate on such matters"); King v.
New Jersey, 767 F.3d 216, 236 (3d Cir. 2014) ("In the context of commercial speech, the Supreme
Court has treated compelled disclosures of truthful factual information differently than prohibitions
of speech, subjecting the former to rational basis review and the latter to intermediate scrutiny.").
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scrutiny, concluding that "[a] statute that governs the practice of an occupation is
not unconstitutional as an abridgment of the right to free speech, so long as any
inhibition of that right is merely the incidental effect of observing an otherwise
legitimate regulation."1 59 In addition, Wollschlaeger cites1 60 Locke v. Shore, a
2011 Eleventh Circuit decision confirming that "[t]here is a difference, for First
Amendment purposes, between regulating professionals' speech to the public at
large versus their direct, personalized speech with clients.' 6
Given that the Supreme Court has never adopted the professional speech
doctrine, it is unsurprising that there is a circuit conflict regarding the proper
standard for professional speech. What is surprising, though, is that Stuart
considers the standard for professional speechl62 without discussing any of the
Fourth Circuit's precedents. The panel cites to Moore-King v. County of
Chesterfield, Virginia,163 which adopts the professional speech doctrine, but only
for the proposition that "[t]he government's regulatory interest is less potent in
the context of a self-regulating profession like medicine."1 64 A closer review of
the Fourth Circuit's professional speech precedents, however, reveals that Stuart
not only conflicts with the Third, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, but also is at
odds with its previous professional speech decisions.165
In Bowman, the Fourth Circuit upheld a Virginia law that barred unlicensed
accountants from using certain terms in reports that were prepared for clients and
directed at third parties as a valid regulation of the accounting profession.166 The
Fourth Circuit panel explained that strict scrutiny did not necessarily apply to
professional regulations even if the regulations restricted speech: "Professional
regulation is not invalid, nor is it subject to first amendment scrutiny, merely
because it restricts some kinds of speech."1 67 The standard of review depended
on the public or private nature of the speech being regulated. The professional
speech doctrine applied to professional-client communications but not to a
professional's statement to the public: "[T]he relevant inquiry to determine

159. Wollschlaeger, 760 F.3d at 1217.
160. Id. at 1219 (quoting Locke v. Shore, 634 F.3d 1185, 1191 (11th Cir. 2011)).
161. Locke, 634 F.3d at 1191.
162. Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 251 (4th Cir. 2014) ("Any state regulation that limits the
free speech rights of professionals must pass the requisite constitutional test.").
163. 708 F.3d 560 (4th Cir. 2013).
164. Stuart, 774 F.3d at 248 (citing Moore-King, 708 F.3d at 570).
165. Compare Stuart, 774 F.3d at 251 ("Though physicians and other professionals may be
subject to regulations by the state that restrict their First Amendment freedoms when acting in the
course of their professions, professionals do not leave their speech rights at the office door."), with
Moore-King, 708 F.3d at 569 (holding that the state's regulation of licensing provisions affecting a
profession raises no First Amendment problems).
166. See Accountants Soc'y of Va. v. Bowman, 860 F.2d 602, 605 (4th Cir. 1988) ("The
statute in question restricts only accountants' communications with and on behalf of their clients, as
a means of regulating the professional activities of non-CPAs.").
167. Id. at 604 (citing Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456-57 (1978)). See
also Moore-King, 708 F.3d at 569 ("the government can . . regulate those who provide services to
their clients for compensation without running afoul of the First Amendment.")
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whether to apply the professional speech doctrine is whether the speaker is
providing personalized advice in a private setting to a paying client or instead
engaged in public discussion and commentary. Professional speech analysis
applies in the former context .... 168 According to the Fourth Circuit, "[t]he
key to distinguishing between occupational regulation and abridgement of [F]irst
[A]mendment liberties is in finding 'a personal nexus between professional and
client." 169 As one commentator has described it, "when a physician speaks to a
patient in the course of medical treatment, his opinions are normally regulated on
the theory that they are inseparable from the practice of medicine."'1 70 The
Fourth Circuit found such a nexus in Bowman because the non-licensed
accountants were "exercis[ing] their professional judgment in making
individualized assessments of each client's financial situation."' 7 ' Consequently,
even though the Virginia statute restricted speech directed at both clients and
third parties, it did not violate the First Amendment because the speech was not
directed to the public.172

Stuart never even considers whether Bowman should apply in the medical
context.
Yet the similarities are pronounced.
Like the accountants in
Bowman,1 73 physicians who perform abortions offer individualized medical
advice to and have a personal nexus with their patients.1 74 As evident from
Stuart's discussion of informed consent, a physician "takes the affairs of a
[patient] personally in hand and purports to exercise judgment on behalf of the
[patient] in light of the [patient]'s individual needs and circumstances." 7 5 North
Carolina's speech-and-display provision, therefore, would seem to fall within the
confines of the professional speech doctrine because it (i) requires physicians to
deliver truthful, nonmisleading information solely within the context of offering
individualized medical advice,176 and (ii) does not compel or restrict any speech
directed to the general public. 7 7 As a result, under the professional speech

168. See Moore-King, 708 F.3d at 569 (quoting Bowman, 860 F.2d at 604).
169. Bowman, 860 F.2d at 604 (quoting Lowe v. S.E.C., 472 U.S. 181, 232 (1985) (White, J.,
concurring)).
170. Robert C. Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A FirstAmendment Analysis of Compelled
Physician Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 939, 949 (2007).
171. Bowman, 860 F.2d at 604.
172. See id. ("While the information compiled by accountants and bookkeepers may be
directed at third parties, it is not aimed at the general public.").
173. See Bowman, 860 F.2d at 604 (quoting Lowe, 472 U.S. at 232 (White, J., concurring)).
174. See, e.g., Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 251-52 (4th Cir. 2014) ("Physicians determine
the 'adequate' information for each patient based on what a reasonable physician would convey,
what a reasonable patient would want to know, and what the individual patient would subjectively
wish to know given the patient's individualized needs and treatment circumstances.").
175. Bowman, 860 F.2d at 604 (quoting Lowe, 472 U.S. at 232).
176. See Stuart, 774 F.3d at 246 (quoting Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v.
Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 577-78 (5th Cir. 2012)) (acknowledging that "[i]t may be true, as the Fifth
Circuit has noted, that 'the required disclosures . . . are the epitome of truthful, non-misleading
information').
177. See Locke v. Shore, 634 F.3d 1185, 1191 (11th Cir. 2011) ("There is a difference, for
First Amendment purposes, between regulating professionals' speech to the public at large versus
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doctrine developed in Bowman and Moore-King, North Carolina would seem to
have the authority to regulate the speech between physicians and patients related
to a sonogram because the speech-and-display requirement "amount[s] to the
permissible regulation of a profession, not an abridgment of speech protected by
the [F]irst [A]mendment."17 s

Given that speech-and-display statutes regulate only the "direct,
personalized speech"1 79 between patients and physicians, such disclosures would
seem to fit within the professional speech doctrine that the Third, Fourth, Ninth,
and Eleventh Circuits developed prior to the Fourth Circuit's decision in Stuart.
Moreover, applying a lower level of scrutiny to doctor-patient communications
related to the abortion procedure appears consistent with the plurality's statement
that the physician's compelled speech claim in Casey was to be viewed "as part
of the practice of medicine, subject to reasonable .

.

. regulation by the State."'180

Yet despite Casey and the concurrences of Justice Jackson in Thomas
and
Justice White in Lowe,182 the Stuart panel subjected North Carolina's speechand-display disclosures to heightened scrutiny.183 As a result, even though the
circuits applying the professional speech doctrine-including the Fourth Circuit
in Bowman-permit states to engage in "a substantial amount of speech
regulation within the professional-client relationship,"1 84 North Carolina's
petition for certiorari will present two important questions regarding the
professional speech doctrine: (i) whether the Court should adopt such a doctrine
and, if so, (ii) whether the applicable standard is rational basis (as Casey and the
Third, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits suggest) or heightened scrutiny (as Stuart
holds).

their direct, personalized speech with clients. Florida's license requirement regulates solely the
latter . . . . [I]t does not implicate constitutionally protected activity under the First Amendment.").
178. Bowman, 860 F.2d at 605.
179. Locke, 634 F.3d at 1191.
180. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992).
181. See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 544 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring).
182. See Lowe v. S.E.C., 472 U.S. 181, 228 (1985) (White, J., concurring).
183. See Stuart, 774 F.3d at 249 ("A heightened intermediate level of scrutiny is thus
consistent with Supreme Court precedent and appropriately recognizes the intersection here of
regulation of speech and regulation of the medical profession in the context of an abortion
procedure.").
184. Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1228 (9th Cir. 2013); see Accountants Soc'y of Va. v.
Bowman, 860 F.2d 602, 604 (4th Cir. 1988) (quoting Underhill Assoc. v. Bradshaw, 674 F.2d 293,
296 (4th Cir. 1982)) ("A statute that governs the practice of an occupation is not unconstitutional as
an abridgment of the right to free speech, so long as 'any inhibition of that right is merely the
incidental effect of observing an otherwise legitimate regulation."').
185. See generally Casey, 505 U.S. at 884 (applying the reasonableness standard); id. at 981
(Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting in part) (arguing that a rational basis standard should be
applied); Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1231 (holding that the statute at issue is subject to rational basis
review).
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Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of

Ohio
In Stuart, the Fourth Circuit concluded that it should "borrow[] a heightened
intermediate scrutiny standard used in certain commercial speech cases."1 86 The
Stuart panel did not mention, let alone analyze, Zauderer, a commercial speech
case involving compelled disclosures in which the Court applied only rational
basis scrutiny. To the extent that the Court's commercial speech precedents are
instructive in the informed consent context, though, Stuart should explain which
line of commercial speech cases is appropriate and why. According to the
Supreme Court, "the extension of First Amendment protection to commercial
speech is justified principally by the value to consumers of the information such
speech provides."' 8 7 Intermediate scrutiny is meant to balance the commercial
speakers' right to control her message and the consumers' interest "in the free
flow of commercial information, [an] interest [that] may be as keen, if not keener
by far, than his interest in the day's most urgent political debate."'s
In Zauderer, however, the Court acknowledges that intermediate scrutiny
does not apply to speech compulsions that require commercial speakers to
disclose factual information.1 89
As the Court notes, an advertiser's
"constitutionally protected interest in not providing any particular factual
information in his advertising is minimal,"1 90 Factual speech compulsions
"trench much more narrowly on an advertiser's interests than do flat
prohibitions" because the government has an important interest in "'dissipat[ing]
the possibility of consumer confusion or deception. "191 As a result, given that
factual disclosures directly help consumers without infringing on an advertiser's
First Amendment rights, the Court applies a lower level of scrutiny.
As Bowman, King, Pickup, and Wollschlaeger demonstrate, the same is true
in other professional-client relationships.192 State regulation is allowed because
"the purpose of those relationships is to advance the welfare of the clients, rather
than to contribute to public debate." 9 3 In the medical context, factual
disclosures relating to abortion or any other medical procedure are permitted to
make sure a patient's decision is well informed.1 94 As Casey explains, "a
requirement that a doctor give a woman certain information as part of obtaining
her consent to an abortion is, for constitutional purposes, no different from a

186. Stuart, 774 F.3d at 248.
187. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).
188. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 763 (1976).
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. (quoting In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 201 (1982)).
192. See Accountant's Soc'y of Va. v. Bowman, 860 F.2d 602, 604 (4th Cir. 1988); Pickup v.
Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1228 (9th Cir. 2013).
193. Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1228.
194. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992).
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requirement that a doctor give certain specific information about any medical
procedure."'1 95 Unlike speech restrictions, speech-and-display laws require
physicians to disclose only factual information and do not otherwise limit the
physicians' communications with his patient or the public generally.
Consequently, such disclosures would seem to trench more narrowly on
physicians' speech rights and, consistent with Zauderer, be subject to a lower
standard of review. If so, then Stuart's use of heightened scrutiny is inconsistent
with Zauderer. Thus, Stuart raises yet another important constitutional issue that
the Court has not yet resolved-whether Zauderer applies outside the
commercial speech context.
Despite the similarities between compelled speech in the commercial and
medical contexts, Stuart does not consider whether Zauderer's exception to
intermediate scrutiny should apply to factual informed consent disclosures.196 In
Zauderer, an Ohio law required attorneys who advertise that they represent
clients on a contingent fee basis "to state that the client may have to bear certain
expenses even if he loses.' 97 Although recognizing that Ohio's disclosures
implicated the First Amendment rights of advertisers, the Court distinguished its
prior cases that struck down speech compulsions.198 In particular, the Court
focused on two aspects of Ohio's required disclosure.1 99 First, the Court
considered the context-commercial speech-and recognized Ohio's important
interest in regulating commercial advertising.200
According to Zauderer,
because Ohio was "not attempt[ing] to 'prescribe what shall be orthodox in
politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to
confess by word or act their faith therein,"' 201 "the interests at stake in this case
are not of the same order as those discussed in Wooley, Tornillo, and
Barnette."202 Instead, Ohio sought only to specify "what shall be orthodox in
commercial advertising," requiring attorneys to include in their advertising
"purely factual and uncontroversial information about the terms under which
[their] services will be available." 203
Second, the Court emphasized the "material differences between disclosure
requirements and outright prohibitions on speech."204 Unlike speech restrictions,
Ohio's regulation did not "prevent attorneys from conveying information to the

195. Casey, 505 U.S. at 884.
196. Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 245 (4th Cir. 2014) (holding content-based regulation of
a medical professional's speech must satisfy at least intermediate scrutiny).
197. Id. at 650.
198. Id. at 641-42 (citing Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 455, 464-66
(1978)).
199. Id. at 650.
200. Id. at 651.
201. Id. at 651 (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)).
202. Id. (citing Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v.
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974); Barnette, 319 U.S. 624).
203. Id.
204. Id. at 650.
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public; it ... only required them to provide somewhat more information than
they might otherwise be inclined to present." 205 As a result, the Court concluded
that "disclosure requirements trench much more narrowly on an advertiser's
interests than do flat prohibitions on speech."20 6 As in Casey, the Court upheld
the disclosure requirement even though the disclosures "implicate[d] the
advertiser's First Amendment rights."207 Although "unjustified or unduly
burdensome" requirements might violate the attorneys' First Amendment rights,
the Court applied rational basis review, concluding that their speech rights were
"adequately protected as long as disclosure requirements are reasonably related
to the State's interest," which in the commercial advertising context was
"preventing deception of consumers." 208
The similarities between Ohio's regulation and North Carolina's speechand-display provision are pronounced.209 First, consistent with the commercial
speech context, the state has a significant interest in regulating the medical
profession. 2 10 As the Court confirmed in Gonzales, "[u]nder our precedents it is
clear the State has a significant role to play in regulating the medical profession,"
which in the abortion context includes "an interest in ensuring so grave a choice
is well informed." 21
Second, as in Zauderer, North Carolina's compelled disclosures do not
prevent doctors from addressing the public or expressing their views to patients
regarding the speech-and-display provision, the sonogram images, the propriety
of having an abortion, informed consent laws generally, or any other issue.2 12
The speech-and-display law requires physicians to provide information that
some doctors might otherwise not be inclined to present, but under Gonzales this
fact supports North Carolina's requiring such disclosures: "In a decision so
fraught with emotional consequence some doctors may prefer not to disclose
precise details of the abortion procedure to be used. It is, however, precisely this

205. Id.
206. Id. at 651 (quoting In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 201 (1982)). The Court also rejected the
appellant's claim that strict scrutiny should apply to compelled disclosures related to the attorneyclient relationship:
Because the First Amendment interests implicated by disclosure requirements are
substantially weaker than those at stake when speech is actually suppressed, we do not
think it appropriate to strike down such requirements merely because other possible
means by which the State might achieve its purposes can be hypothesized.
Id. at 651-52 n.14.
207. Id. at 651.
208. Id.
209. See Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 242 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 9021.85(b) (2013)); Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651.
210. See Stuart, 774 F.3d at 242 (outlining the state's interest to ensure informed consent);
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S 124, 157 (2007) (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,
731 (1997)) (outlining the state's interest in protecting the integrity of the medical profession);
Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651 (outlining the state's interest in preventing the deception of consumers).
211. Gonzaeles, 550 U.S. at 157, 159.
212. Stuart, 774 F.3d at 243-44, 249 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.82 (2013)).
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lack of information that is of legitimate concern to the State." 213 To the extent a
physician does not think the required disclosures are medically relevant, the
physician is free to explain those views to the woman seeking an abortion as well
214
as to the public generally.
Furthermore, given that speech-and-display laws do not restrict any
215
physician speech, Stuart's reliance on Hurley is misplaced.
Stuart cites
Hurley for the proposition that "[1]isteners may have difficulty discerning that
the message is the state's, not the speaker's, especially where the 'speaker [is]
intimately connected with the communication advanced."' 216 In the patientphysician context, though, Zauderer indicates why Hurley's concerns about the
217
impact of compelled speech on third parties do not apply.
Because North
Carolina's sonogram disclosures do not impose any speech restrictions on the
physician, there is no threat that a listener-a woman seeking an abortionwould think that the speech-and-display requirement is conveying the
physician's message (unless, of course, the doctor agrees with that message and
does not exercise his broad speech rights to distance himself from or criticize the
218
requirement).
In fact, under Gonzales the subsequent dialogue between the
patient and her physician might further the state's interest in ensuring that the
woman makes an informed decision: "The State's interest in respect for life is
advanced by the dialogue that better informs the political and legal systems, the
medical profession, expectant mothers, and society as a whole ... ."219

Third, as in Zauderer,220 the interests at stake in the speech-and-display
22
context are not of the same order as those discussed in Wooley 1 and Barnette.
North Carolina's factual disclosures do not "prescribe what shall be orthodox in
politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to
confess by word or act their faith therein."222 Because the communications
between patients and physicians occur in private, some courts might conclude,
like the Ninth Circuit in Pickup, that "the First Amendment tolerates a

213. See Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 159 (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 873 (1992)).
214. See Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 60 (2006)
(rejecting a compelled speech claim because "[1]aw schools remain free . . to express whatever
views they may have on the military's congressionally mandated employment policy").
215. See Stuart, 774 F.3d at 245-46 (quoting Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual
Grp. of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 573, 576 (1995)).
216. Id. at 246 (quoting Hurley, 515 U.S. at 576).
217. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (quoting W. Va. State Bd.
of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)).
218. See Stuart, 774 F.3d at 246 (discussing a doctor's ability to supplement the compelled
speech).
219. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S 124, 160 (2007).
220. See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651 (outlining the state's interest in preventing the deception
of consumers).
221. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 716 (1977) (explaining the state's interest in the
display of the South Carolina motto on its license plates).
222. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
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substantial

amount

of speech regulation

within

the

professional-client

relationship that it would not tolerate outside of it." 223 Although North Carolina

has required certain disclosures, it has done so only in relation to specific
truthful, nonmisleading information designed to "reduc[e] the risk that a woman
may elect an abortion, only to discover later, with devastating psychological
consequences, that her decision was not fully informed."224
As a result, the Fourth Circuit's use of heightened scrutiny appears at odds
with the reasons given in Zauderer and Casey for applying rational basis
review.225 Although both cases acknowledge that the mandated disclosures
"implicate" the First Amendment rights or professionals, both conclude that,
because the disclosures involved truthful, nonmisleading information, those
"rights are adequately protected as long as disclosure requirements are
reasonably related to the State's interests."226 In Zauderer, the state's interest
involved preventing deception of consumers in the commercial speech
context.227 In Casey, Pennsylvania sought to advance its interests in protecting
the psychological well-being of the woman contemplating an abortion and in
promoting childbirth over abortion.228
Through its speech-and-display
requirements, North Carolina seeks to do the same thing promoting childbirth
over abortion and ensuring that a woman's decision is fully informed.229
Provided that the disclosed information is truthful, nonmisleading, and relevant
to the state's interests, Zauderer and Casey suggest that North Carolina may
require "the physician [to] provide the information mandated" provided that the
disclosures are reasonable.230
Going forward, then, courts-including the Supreme Court if it grants North
Carolina's petition for certiorari in Stuart-must determine the proper scope of

223. Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1228 (9th Cir. 2013); see also ROBERT C. POST,
DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE FOR
THE MODERN STATE 24 (Yale Univ. Press 2012) ("Within public discourse, the First Amendment

requires law to respect the autonomy of speakers rather than to protect the targets of speech; outside
public discourse, the First Amendment permits the state to control the autonomy of speakers in
order to protect the dignity of the targets of speech.").
224. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992).
225. See generally Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 249 (4th Cir. 2014) (discussing North
Carolina's speech-and-display provisions and applying intermediate scrutiny).
226. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985) (holding that
Ohio's disclosures "implicate[d]" the First Amendment rights of physicians but that their "rights are
adequately protected as long as disclosure requirements are reasonably related to the State's
interest."); Casey, 505 U.S. at 884 (recognizing that compelled disclosures implicate a physician's
First Amendment rights, "but only as part of the practice of medicine, subject to reasonable
licensing and regulation by the State.").
227. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651.
228. Casey, 505 U.S. at 882.
229. Stuart, 774 F.3d at 250 (quoting Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S 124, 159 (2007)).
230. Casey, 505 U.S. at 884. Compare Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651 (noting that Ohio required
"that appellant include in his advertising purely factual and uncontroversial information"), with
Casey, 505 U.S. at 882 (recognizing that required disclosures may be constitutional "[i]f the
information the State requires to be made available to the woman is truthful and not misleading").
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Zauderer. Does Zauderer's reasoning apply outside the commercial speech
context? Is Zauderer a precursor to the professional speech doctrine? If so,
should courts apply rational basis to factual disclosures whenever the
government has a special interest in regulating a given area (e.g., commercial
speech or the practice of medicine) and does not "'prescribe what shall be
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force
citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein'? 23 1 Or are there reasons to

limit Zauderer to the commercial speech context? And if so, what does that tell
us about the plurality's resolution of the compelled disclosures in Casey? How
the Court answers these questions may determine whether speech-and-display
laws-as well as required disclosures in various other professional contexts-are
constitutional.
C.

Whether FactualDisclosures Constitute IdeologicalSpeech

In addition to relying on the professional speech doctrine, the Fourth Circuit
contends that heightened scrutiny is appropriate because North Carolina's
speech-and-display law compels "ideological" speech.232 If the speech-anddisplay disclosures are ideological, the circuit courts seem to agree that some
233
form of heightened scrutiny might apply.
But only the Fourth Circuit
concludes that these disclosures are in fact ideological.234 Although never
expressly defining "ideological," the Fourth Circuit suggests that speech is
ideological in the speech-and-display context if the intent or effect of the speech
is to dissuade a woman from having an abortion: "The clear import of displaying
the sonogram in this context-while the woman who has requested an abortion is
partially disrobed on an examination table-is to use the visual imagery of the
fetus to dissuade the patient from continuing with the planned procedure."235
The panel focuses on the state's reasons for conveying the particular
information: "The state freely admits that the purpose and anticipated effect of
the [speech-and-display requirement] is to convince women seeking abortions to
change their minds or reassess their decisions."236 Under the Fourth Circuit's
view, then, the speech-and-display "statement compelled here is ideological"
because "it conveys a particular opinion" 237-that the state wants to promote
childbirth over abortion. Although "the words the state puts into the doctor's
mouth are factual, that does not divorce the speech from its moral or ideological

231. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651 (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,
642 (1943)).
232. See Stuart, 774 F.3d 238, 245.
233. Stuart, 774 F.3d at 249; Lakey, 667 F.2d at 575.
234. Stuart, 774 F.3d at 245.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 246.
237. Id.
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implications." 238 The intent to dissuade coupled with the timing-"shortly
before the time of decision when the intended recipient is most vulnerable" 239
transforms factual disclosures into an ideological message.
The Fourth Circuit's interpretation of ideological speech raises three
additional problems for courts and practitioners who are trying to figure out the
proper level of scrutiny to apply to speech-and-display disclosures. First, the
panel's definition of ideological speech directly conflicts with the Fifth Circuit's
position. In Lakey, the Fifth Circuit invokes Wooley to support its conclusion
that "ideological" speech refers to speech that expresses a point of view.240 In
Wooley, New Hampshire's license plate promulgated a message, "Live Free or
Die," that conveyed a point of view that the Maynards found "morally, ethically,
religiously and politically abhorrent." 241 According to the Fifth Circuit, truthful,
nonmisleading information related to a woman's decisions to have an abortion is
not factual, no ideological: "Though there may be questions at the margins,
surely a photograph and description of its features constitute the purest
conceivable expression of 'factual information."' 242 Such factual informationeven if intended to encourage childbirth over abortion-does not constitute
243
ideological speech that warrants heightened scrutiny.
To the extent that
receiving factual information (viewing the sonogram images and hearing a
description of those images) causes a woman to forego an abortion, "that is a
function of the combination of her new knowledge and her own 'ideology'
('values' is a better term), not of any 'ideology' inherent in the information she
has learned about the fetus."244
Although the disclosures in Casey (which made a woman aware that
information about fetal development was available) differ from those in Stuart
245
(which ensure that the information is provided),
the question is whether this
difference makes a constitutional difference. Under Lakey, the answer is "no."246

238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977) ("Here . . we are faced with a state
measure which forces an individual . . to be an instrument for fostering public adherence to an
ideological point of view he finds unacceptable.").
241. Id. at 713.
242. Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 577 n.4 (5th
Cir. 2012).
243. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 872.
244. Lakey, 667 F.3d at 577 n.4.
245. Compare Casey, 505 U.S. at 884 (stating the disclosures at issue were not a large burden
and upholding them as a reasonable means to ensure a woman's consent is informed), with Stuart,
774 F.3d at 252 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.82 (2013)) (explaining that the statute reaches
beyond the modified form of informed consent approved in Casey), and Stuart v. Huff, 834 F. Supp.
2d 424, 431 (M.D.N.C. 2011) (stating that the disclosures at issue go well beyond the bounds
traditionally considered part of the informed consent process).
246. Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 580 (5th Cir.
2012) (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 883) (stating that the disclosures at issue, while more graphic
than those in Casey, are no different in kind).
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Although speech-and-display provisions require a more direct method of
delivery, they do not alter the type of information that the state seeks to impart to
a woman: "They are not different in kind, although more graphic and
scientifically up-to-date, than the disclosures discussed in Casey probable
gestational age of the fetus and printed material showing a baby's general
prenatal development stages." 247 Because speech-and-display laws require
physicians to disclose only factual information, the Fifth Circuit, contrary to
Stuart, subjects such provisions to rational basis review.
Second, the Fourth Circuit's position-that speech is ideological if the intent
of the mandated speech "is to convince women seeking abortions to change their
minds or reassess their decisions" 248-contradicts
Casey's express
acknowledgement that states can require doctors to disclose information "to
ensure an informed choice, one which might cause the woman to choose
,249
childbirth over abortion."
Under the Fourth Circuit's analysis, even the
disclosures in Casey would seem to constitute ideological speech because they
"might cause the woman to choose childbirth over abortion."250 But if this is
correct, then Casey should have resolved the physicians' compelled speech claim
differently, applying at least intermediate scrutiny.251 But Casey did not impose
concluding that the disclosures were constitutional as "a
heightened scrutiny,
reasonable measure to ensure an informed choice."253
The Fourth Circuit's view of ideological speech254 is also at odds with
Gonzales, which recognizes that a state may compel disclosures that are intended
to and may have the effect of causing some women to forego an abortion: "It is a
reasonable inference that a necessary effect of the regulation and the knowledge
it conveys will be to encourage some women to carry the infant to full term, thus
reducing the absolute number of late-term abortions."255 Given that the truthful,
nonmisleading disclosures in Gonzales did not trigger heightened scrutiny even
though they were intended to (and actually did) reduce the number of abortions,
it is not clear that Stuart is warranted in subjecting speech-and-display
provisions to heightened scrutiny. In both situations:

247. Id.
248 Stuart, 774 F.3d at 246.
249. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 883 (1992).
250 Id.
251. See id.
252. Casey is devoid of strict scrutiny language. The plurality repeatedly referenced
Pennsylvania's "legitimate goal" of protecting unborn life and stated that compelled physician
disclosures are permissible "as part of the practice of medicine, [which is] subject to
reasonable . . regulation by the State." Casey, 505 U.S. at 884 (emphasis added). In addition,
Casey never considered whether Pennsylvania had any compelling interest in requiring physicians
to speak or whether the Pennsylvania statute was narrowly tailored.
253. Id.
254. See Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 246 (4th Cir. 2014).
255. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 160 (2007).
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The State has an interest in ensuring so grave a choice is well informed.
It is self-evident that a mother who comes to regret her choice to abort
must struggle with grief more anguished and sorrow more profound
when she learns, only after the event, what she once did not know: that
she allowed a doctor to [abort] her unborn child, a child assuming the
human form.

256

Even though "[a]ny number of patients facing imminent surgical procedures
would prefer not to hear all details, lest the usual anxiety preceding invasive
medical procedures become the more intense," 257 the state still has a "legitimate
concern" in correcting for what the state perceives is a "lack of information
concerning" the procedure as well as in advancing "[t]he State's interest in
respect for life." 258
Third, Stuart's focus on the effect speech-and-display disclosures might
have on a woman considering whether to have an abortion259 reintroduces
arguments made in Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health260 and
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists,261 but
262
According to Casey, Thornburgh determined that the
rejected in Casey.
informed consent provisions in Akron were problematic for two reasons: "the
information was designed to dissuade the woman from having an abortion and
the ordinance imposed 'a rigid requirement that a specific body of information
be given in all cases, irrespective of the particular needs of the patient."' 263 The
Fourth Circuit makes the same claims in Stuart, finding North Carolina's speechand-display provision unconstitutional because it seeks to discourage abortion264
and to provide information that some women may not want or that might even be
harmful in a specific situation.265

256. Id. at 159-60.
257. Id. at 159.
258. Id. at 159-60 (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 873 (1992)).
259. See Stuart, 774 F.3d at 250.
260. 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
261. 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
262. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 883.
263. Casey, 505 U.S. at 881-82 (quoting Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 762).
264. See Stuart, 774 F.3d at 245 ("The clear import of displaying the sonogram in this
context . . . is to use the visual imagery of the fetus to dissuade the patient from continuing with the
planned procedure."); see also id. at 246 ("The state freely admits that the purpose and anticipated
effect . . [are] to convince women seeking abortions to change their minds or reassess their
decisions.").
265. See, e.g., id. at 252 ("The most serious deviation from standard practice is requiring the
physician to display an image and provide an explanation and medical description to a woman who
has through ear and eye covering rendered herself temporarily deaf and blind."); id. at 253 ("[F]ar
from promoting the psychological health of women, this requirement risks the infliction of
psychological harm on the woman who chooses not to receive the information.").
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Like the Fourth Circuit in Stuart,266 Akron expressed concern about forcing
physicians to deliver information that might be irrelevant to a woman's
267
According to Thornburgh, such information about fetal
particular situation.
characteristics might "serve only to confuse and punish [the woman] and to
,26 8
Thornburgh also
heighten her anxiety, contrary to accepted medical practice."
suggested that requiring information about medical assistance and paternity may,
"[f]or a patient with a life-threatening pregnancy,... be cruel as well as
destructive of the physician-patient relationship" and that "a victim of rape
should not have to hear gratuitous advice that an unidentified perpetrator is liable
for support."

269

Echoing these concerns, the Stuart panel worries that "'forcing

'

this experience on a patient over her objections' in this manner interferes with
the decision of a patient not to receive information that could make an
indescribably difficult decision even more traumatic and could 'actually cause
harm to the patient."' 270 The Fourth Circuit's analysis essentially repeats the
petitioners' claims in Casey that Pennsylvania's informed consent statute
compelled ideological speech that triggered and failed strict scrutiny because it
"forced [physicians] to convey the state's message at the cost of violating their
own conscientious beliefs and professional commitments." 27
Courts considering whether to adopt the Fourth Circuit's analysis, therefore,
confront a problem the plurality rejected the petitioners' claims in Casey and
overturned Thornburgh and Akron.272 In so doing, the plurality acknowledged
that the physical and psychological health of the woman are critically
273
important,
but Casey confirmed that the state has the authority to determine
that specific information should be given to patients to ensure that their decisions
274
are fully informed.
Under Casey and Gonzales, if (i) the information is factual
and (ii) doctors remain free to express their views about abortion and a woman's
treatment, then reasonable factual disclosures implicate physicians' First

266. See id.
267. See Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 445 (1985) ("For
example, even if the physician believes that some of the risks outlined in subsection (5) are
nonexistent for a particular patient, he remains obligated to describe them to her."); Thornburgh,
476 U.S. at 762 ("The mandated description of fetal characteristics at 2-week intervals, no matter
how objective, is plainly overinclusive. This is not medical information that is always relevant to
the woman's decision .... ).
268. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 762. In Stuart, the Fourth Circuit also invokes standards of the
medical practice to support its holding. See Stuart, 774 F.3d at 255. The panel expresses its concern
that "[t]he information is provided irrespective of the needs or wants of the patient, in direct
contravention of medical ethics and the principle of patient autonomy." Id.
269. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 763.
270. Stuart, 774 F.3d at 255.
271. Brief for Petitioners and Cross-Respondents, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992) (Nos. 91-744, 91-902), 1992 WL 551419, at *54.
272. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992).
273. See id. at 846.
274. See id. at 873.
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275

Amendment rights but do not violate those rights.
Subjecting such factual
disclosures to heightened scrutiny, therefore, is inappropriate for the same
reasons that Casey overruled Akron and Thornburgh-it "go[es] too far" and
undervalues the state's "important interest in potential life." 276

Thus, courts

considering speech-and-display provisions in the wake of Stuart and Lakey must
consider carefully whether applying heightened scrutiny is consistent with
Casey's rejection of Akron and Thornburgh.
D.

Whalen v. Roe

Stuart highlights another unresolved issue that has crept into the case law
regarding the standard of review for compelled disclosures in the medical
context: what to do with Casey's invocation of Whalen v. Roe. The Fourth
Circuit relies heavily on Casey's statement that "the physician's First
Amendment rights not to speak are implicated" 277 to support its claim that

individuals do not "simply abandon their First Amendment rights when they
commence practicing a profession." 278 But the panel completely ignores the fact
that Casey invokes Whalen to confirm that the physicians' First Amendment
rights are implicated "but only as part of the practice of medicine, subject to
reasonable licensing and regulation by the State." 279 Despite Casey's indicating
that Wooley does not apply with the same force to regulations of the "practice of
medicine" and stating that the government therefore can impose "reasonable"
280
regulations,
Stuart holds that this "single paragraph in Casey ... does not
[announce] the proper level of scrutiny to be applied to abortion regulations that
compel speech to the extraordinary extent present here." 281' But Stuart, like the
district court opinion that it affirms, never mentions Whalen or considers what
role that case plays in Casey's analysis of physicians' First Amendment
-282
claims.
Any complete account of Casey, though, must explain the plurality's
invocation of both cases. Wooley confirms that compelled speech implicates the
283
First Amendment rights of physicians.
But what does Whalen do? To

275. See Stuart, 774 F.3d at 249 (quoting Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v.
Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 576 (5th Cir. 2012); Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds
(Rounds 1), 530 F.3d 724, 734-35 (8th Cir. 2008) (en banc)).
276. Casey, 505 U.S. at 882.
277. Casey, 505 U.S. at 884.
278. Stuart, 774 F.3d at 247.
279. Casey, 505 U.S. at 884.
280. Id.
281. Stuart, 774 F.3d at 249.
282. The Stuart panel suggests that there are different levels of compelled speech and that
heightened scrutiny is required given that speech-and-display laws "compel speech to [an]
extraordinary extent." Id. But speech is either compelled or it is not. The nature of the underlying
circumstances would seem to go to the woman's due process claim rather than the physician's First
Amendment claim.
283. See id. (discussing the impact of Wooley on compelling physician's speech).
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understand that, one must look carefully at the section of Whalen to which Casey
284
cites.
The Fourth Circuit does not even try to reconcile tis heightened scrutiny
analysis with Casey and halen and, consequently, reaches a decision at odds
with both cases.
In halen, the Supreme Court considered whether a New York law
requiring physicians to prepare prescriptions for certain drugs in triplicate and to
file at least one of the copies with the state violated the constitutional right to
privacy of prescribing physicians and their patients.285 Through the prescription
requirement, the New York legislature sought to facilitate enforcement of laws
prohibiting the misuse of controlled substances and to deter those who might
286
violate those laws.
The physicians and patients filed suit, claiming that the
possibility of disclosure would make "some patients reluctant to use, and some
doctors reluctant to prescribe [the applicable] drugs even when their use is
medically indicated."2 87 The plaintiffs argued that the law "threaten[ed] to
impair both their interest in the nondisclosure of private information and also
their interest in making important decisions independently."2 88 The Supreme
Court rejected these claims, concluding that the statute was "manifestly the
product of an orderly and rational legislative decision," that there "was nothing
unreasonable in the assumption" that the statute might help officials enforce laws
designed to reduce the use of dangerous drugs, and that the law "could
reasonably be expected to have a deterrent effect on potential violators."
In the section of Walen to which Casey refers, the Court recognized that the
state has broad latitude to regulate the practice of medicine provided that such
regulations do not: (1) preclude public access to a legitimate medical procedure
or treatment, (2) prevent a patient from deciding, in consultation with her
290
physician whether to pursue the procedure or treatment,
or (3) condition the
doctor's ability to pursue such a procedure or treatment on government
291
In halen, as in Casey, the Court explained that what "is at stake" is
consent.
the ability of a patient to make the ultimate decision in consultation with her
physician.292 As long as "the decision ... is left entirely to the physician and the
patient," 293 the state has substantial freedom to adopt reasonable regulations that
294
Moreover, the Whalen Court
may affect the decision-making process.

284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
at 603.
289.
290.
prescribe,
291.
292.
293.
294.

See id.
Whalen, 429 U.S. at 591, 593.
Id. at 597-98.
Id. at 600.
Id. The court noted that "the statute did not deprive the public of access to the drugs." Id.
Id. at 597-98.
Id. at 603 ("Within dosage limits which appellees do not challenge, the decision to
or to use, is left entirely to the physician and the patient.").
Id.
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992).
Whalen, 429 U.S. at 603.
See id.
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determined that to the extent the compelled disclosures impaired the doctors'
"right to practice medicine free of unwarranted state interference . . . the doctors'

claim is derivative from, and therefore no stronger than, the patients' [claim]."295
Although Whalen did not involve a First Amendment claim, Casey
incorporated the principles of Whalen into the abortion context generally, and the
compelled physician speech context in particular.296 This is not surprising given
that (i) Casey expressly states that "the doctor-patient relation here is entitled to
,,297
and (i) Casey and Whalen
the same solicitude it receives in other contexts,
are similar in several important respects. Both cases involve claims that a state
law compelling disclosures violated a patient's Fourteenth Amendment rights in
connection with a medical procedure or treatment.298 Both emphasize that the
patient must have the right to make the ultimate decision about the medical
procedure or treatment, but that the state may adopt regulations-even ones that
might be considered unnecessary-that affect that right.299 Both include
allegations that the governing laws violated the rights of patients and
physicians. 300 Both indicate that the state may require physicians to engage in
activities that burden the physicians' practice of medicine. 301 Both hold that the
302
rights of the physician are derivative of those of the patient.
In light of
Whalen, then, it becomes clear why Casey summarily disposed of the
physicians' First Amendment claims.303 Because the compelled disclosures did
not unduly burden a woman's right to choose, there was "no constitutional
infirmity in the requirement that the physician provide the information."304
Ignoring the derivative nature of a physician's rights, the Fourth Circuit
contends that "[t]he fact that a regulation does not impose an undue burden on a
woman under the due process clause does not answer the question of whether it
imposes an impermissible burden on the physician under the First
Amendment."305 The Fourth Circuit allows doctors to assert a separate First
Amendment claim even though Casey instructs that "[t]he doctor-patient relation
does not underlie or override the two more general rights under which the

295. Id. at 604.
296. Casey, 505 U.S. at 884 ("On its own, the doctor-patient relation here is entitled to the
same solicitude it receives in other contexts. Thus, a requirement that a doctor give a woman certain
information as part of obtaining her consent to an abortion is, for constitutional purposes, no
different from a requirement that a doctor give certain specific information about any medical
procedure.").
297. Id.
298. See id. at 846, 877; Whalen, 429 U.S. at 603-04.
299. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 877; Whalen, 429 U.S. at 603.
300. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 883; Whalen, 429 U.S. at 603-04.
301. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 884; Whalen, 429 U.S. at 600.
302. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 604; see also Casey, 505 U.S. at 884 ("Whatever constitutional
status the doctor-patient relation may have as a general matter, in the present context it is derivative
of the woman's position.").
303. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 884.
304. Id.
305. Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 249 (4th Cir. 2014).
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abortion right is justified: the right to make family decisions and the right to
physical autonomy."30 6 As a result, the Fourth Circuit erroneously contends that
applying rational basis review to the physicians' claims would create a new First
307
Amendment test.

But Whalen shows why the Fourth Circuit's analysis is incorrect. 308 By
citing to Whalen, Casey confirmed that disclosure requirements implicate the
physician's First Amendment rights but that in the context of the practice of
medicine
such
disclosures
are constitutional
provided
they
are
"reasonable ... regulation[s] by the State." 309 Whalen, in turn, invokes Doe v.
Bolton to confirm this understanding of a physician's rights:
Nothing in [Doe] suggests that a doctor's right to administer medical
care has any greater strength than his patient's right to receive such
care .

.

. If [the abortion restrictions at issue in Doe] had not impacted

upon the woman's freedom to make a constitutionally protected
decision, if they had merely made the physician's work more laborious
or less independent without any impact on the patient, they would not
310
have violated the Constitution.
Because the physician's rights are derived from those of his or her patient, the
doctor does not receive greater protection under the First Amendment than the
311
patient gets under the Due Process Clause.
In Casey, the central concern was
"the right of a pregnant woman to decide whether or not to bear a child without
unwarranted state interference."312
The plurality held that the compelled
disclosures did not unduly burden a woman's right to choose and, consequently,
that there was "no constitutional infirmity in the requirement that the physician
provide the information."313
Although speech-and-display requirements may force doctors "to provide
somewhat more information than they might otherwise be inclined to present," 314
Casey and Whalen indicate that they are constitutional because those disclosures
do not limit the physicians' ability to advise their patients about the import of the
sonogram and whether they believe an abortion is appropriate under the

306. Casey, 505 U.S. at 884.
307. Stuart, 774 F.3d at 245
308. See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 604.
309. Id.
310. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 604 n.33 (citing Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 197-98 (1973)).
311. Casey, 505 U.S. at 884 (holding that physicians do not gamer additional protection
because the "doctor-patient relation does not underlie or override the two more general rights under
which the abortion right is justified: the right to make family decisions and the right to physical
autonomy").
312. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 604 n.33 (citing Doe, 410 U.S. at 197-98); see also Casey, 505 U.S.
at 883 (discussing informed choice as a legitimate goal of the state).
313. Casey, 505 U.S. at 884.
314. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 650 (1984).
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circumstances.315 Under this interpretation, Whalen provides direct support for
the application of rational basis scrutiny to speech-and-display disclosures. 316 Of
course, Stuart provides the Supreme Court with the opportunity to determine
whether this interpretation of Whalen and Casey is correct or whether the Fourth
Circuit properly held that the speech-and-display disclosures are beyond the
regulatory authority of the state. The Court's resolution of this issue will
determine the scope of a state's authority to require truthful, nonmisleading
disclosures that advance its interests in "Ensuring a decision that is mature and
informed" and in "express[ing] a preference for childbirth over abortion."3 17

315. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 882; Whalen, 429 U.S. at 604 n.33 (citing Doe, 410 U.S. at 19798).
316. See Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 245 (4th Cir. 2014) (summarizing the state's
argument that the requirement at issue should be treated only as a regulation of the medical
profession subject to rational basis review).
317. Casey, 505 U.S. at 883.
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